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RISK AVERSION, SUPPLY RESPONSE, AND THE 
OPTIMALITY OF RANDOM PRICES: 
A DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS* 
DAVID M. G. NEWBERY AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
This paper analyzes the effect of commodity price stabilization on producers and 
consumers, both in the short run, and in the long run, when producers have adjusted 
their production decisions to take account of the change in the price distribution. We 
derive conditions under which (a) both producers and consumers may be better off; 
and (b) both producers and consumers may be worse off. Moreover, we show that the 
long-run effects may differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from the 
short-run effects. The anomalous results may occur even with reasonable assumptions 
concerning production functions and utility functions of producers and consumers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a long-standing controversy concerning whether 
it is profitable for firms to randomize their prices, and indeed, whether 
consumers might be better off as a result of randomization of prices. 
Waugh [1944] pointed out that consumers would prefer to buy at 
random prices rather than at prices stabilized at the arithmetic mean. 
Oi [1961] showed that competitive producers would earn higher profits 
by selling at varying prices than by selling at prices stabilized at their 
arithmetic mean. However, as Samuelson [1972, p. 488] forcefully 
argued, where competitive laissez faire leads to stability, "no bootstrap 
operation of manufactured price instability can accomplish the 
wonderful promises of the Waugh and Oi prospectuses, namely to 
* Research support from the National Science Foundation, the Social Science 
Research Council of the United Kingdom, and IBM (United Kingdom) is gratefully 
acknowledged. Part of the research upon which this paper is based was done while 
Stiglitz held the Oskar Morgenstern Distinguished Research Fellowship at Mathe- 
matica and was Visiting Professor at The Institute for Advanced Study, and while 
Newbery was visiting Mathematica. We are indebted to Rob Porter for helpful com- 
ments. 
? 1982 by the President and- Fellows of Harvard College. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1982 CCC 0033-5533/82/010001-26$02.60 
2 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
make both producers and consumers better off." The argument is that 
any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient, so any movement 
away from one equilibrium to another must make some agents worse 
off. 
Another way of putting the argument is to observe that it will not 
in general be feasible to keep the mean price constant, for mean sales 
will in general change as prices are destabilized, as will mean supply. 
Although profits and utility are convex in prices, production functions 
and utility are conventionally assumed concave in quantities, dem- 
onstrating the infeasibility of making both parties better off by 
destabilization. 
The argument that, since any competitive equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient, any movement away from one equilibrium to another must 
make some agents worse off, rests on all the assumptions underlying 
the fundamental theorem of welfare economics. It was noted, for in- 
stance, in Stiglitz [1976], Atkinson and Stiglitz [1976], and Weiss 
[1976], that if there is distortionary taxation, randomization of prices 
(taxes) could lead to a Pareto improvement; Newbery [1978] showed 
that the same kind of argument could be used to demonstrate that 
in the presence of imperfect competition, it might be possible to make 
everyone better off by destabilizing prices. This paper shows that if 
there is an exogenous source of instability in a competitive economy, 
and an incomplete set of insurance markets, it may make both pro- 
ducers and consumers worse off to stabilize prices, or putting it more 
dramatically, it may make both parties better off to destabilize prices 
further. 
The object of this paper is to establish this, and, more generally, 
to explore, in the simplest possible model, the equilibrium supply 
responses to changes in the probability distribution of prices. The 
output of farmers is a function of their effort (inputs) and a random 
variable (weather). Effort, in turn, is a function of the price distri- 
bution (and the distribution of returns per unit effort). Prices, in turn, 
are set, in the absence of a commodity price stabilization scheme, at 
market-clearing levels to equate demand to supply. 
A commodity price stabilization scheme represents a transfer 
of output from a high output state to a low output state. The short-run 
impact is defined as the effect on the welfare of producers or con- 
sumers, assuming that effort (inputs) remain unchanged. The long- 
run impact takes into account the effects on the level of supply. We 
establish two important results: 
a. The long-run impact may differ not only quantitatively but 
also qualitatively from the short-run impact: producers may be better 
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(worse) off in the short run, but worse off (better off) in the long 
run. 
b. A commodity price stabilization scheme may make both 
consumers and producers worse off. 
The first result is somewhat surprising; normally, we expect 
impact and long-run results to differ in magnitude, but not in direc- 
tion. The intuitive reason for the conventional view may be put as 
follows: assume that stabilizing commodity prices improves the wel- 
fare of producers in the short run. This will lead them to produce more 
(since the "certainty equivalent" return to farming is greater). But 
they will never increase output so much as to decrease price levels to 
the point that utility was the same as it was prior to commodity price 
stabilization; for if they were to do so, the certainty equivalent return 
to farming would be the same as it was prior to stabilization-in which 
case inputs (effort) would be the same, in which case output would 
be the same. 
What is wrong with this argument is that it assumes that there 
is a simple relationship between expected marginal utility (which 
determines the level of effort) and expected total utility; in the case 
of constant relative risk aversion, there is a simple (proportional) 
relationship, and it is this that accounts for the simple results obtained 
in our earlier paper [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979a]. But if relative risk 
aversion is not constant (and there is no reason to assume that it is), 
then the two may move in quite different ways. 
The second result has a simple interpretation. Price stabilization 
may increase income instability; since prices and output are negatively 
correlated, if the elasticity of demand is not too low, income variability 
is less than output variability. (See Newbery and Stiglitz [1977, 1981].) 
Thus, under not implausible conditions, price stabilization makes 
producers worse off in the short run; if there is constant relative risk 
aversion (weaker conditions will suffice), then effort and aggregate 
output (in all states of nature) will be reduced. This will modify the 
quantitative effect on producers' welfare, but they will still be worse 
off in the long run. In addition, consumers will be worse off as a result 
of the lowering of output; they will be better off as a result of the re- 
duction in the variability of sales. In general, the net effect is ambig- 
uous, but there are conditions in which the net effect is unambigu- 
ously negative. 
As we observe later, these perversities are not (necessarily) re- 
lated to a failure of the usual stability condition to hold. They can 
obtain for quite reasonable values of the parameters. 
It may be worth briefly commenting on the difference between 
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our paper and the extensive literature on the theory of commodity 
price stabilization. Most of that literature assumes risk neutrality, 
compares no stabilization with perfect, costless stabilization, and 
measures welfare gains by changes in average consumer-plus-producer 
surplus. (For a recent example and for extensive references, see Wright 
[1979].) It should be clear from the arguments given above that our 
results depend crucially on the (realistic) assumptions that agents are 
not risk-neutral and that there is not a complete set of insurance 
markets. (See Newbery and Stiglitz [1979b].) Elsewhere [Newbery 
and Stiglitz, 1979a] we have argued against the assumption that prices 
can feasibly be perfectly stabilized, and we developed a method of 
analyzing small changes in the degree of stabilization. In the present 
simpler model this approach has an appealing diagrammatic repre- 
sentation. Finally, we use a utility-based approach, rather than a 
Marshallian surplus analysis, which is, of course, quite unsuited to 
dealing with risk aversion. A more extensive critique of the current 
literature on price stabilization, and especially of the consumer sur- 
plus-based approach, is to be found in our forthcoming book [Newbery 
and Stiglitz, 1981]. 
II. THE MODEL 
We develop here the simplest model for establishing our results. 
We assume two equally probable states of the world. Output per 
farmer in state i is qi: 
(1) qi = ix, i =1, 2, 
where x is the "input," here interpreted as labor effort. Without loss 
of generality, we let 
61 < 02, (01 + 02)/2 = 1, 
so without price stabilization, prices pi satisfy 
P1 > P2- 
(There is no demand variability.) We assume constant returns to ef- 
fort but a separate utility function with increasing disutility of effort 
(indistinguishable from diminishing returns to effort) so the farmers' 
expected utility is 
(2) W = EU = 1/2u(p101x) + 1/2u(p202x) - V(x), 
where 
(2a) u' > O. u" > O. v' > O, v" > O. 
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An equilibrium price stabilization scheme must ensure that average 
supply equals average demand:1 
(3) D(p1) + D(P2) = 2Q, 
(4) Q = nEq = nx, 
where n is the number of farmers (all of whom are assumed to be 
identical). Each farmer chooses effort x, to maximize expected utility, 
yielding first-order conditions: 
(5) Eu'pO - 1/2(ulPl0l + u'2P202) = v', 
where u' is marginal utility of income, yi in state i: 
ui U'(yi), yi PAjX. 
III. OUTLINE OF THE ANALYSIS 
In this simple two-state model, we can describe allocations by 
points in price space (P1,P2). Then any price stabilization scheme is 
just a new pair of prices lp*,p*1, which lies closer to the 450 line than 
the original set of prices. (The 450 line represents perfect price sta- 
bility.) In the subsequent analysis, we shall derive the short-run 
feasibility locus, i.e., the set of prices for which demand equals supply, 
assuming that the change in the price distribution has no effect on 
output (denoted SR in the diagrams); we shall also derive the long-run 
feasibility locus, (denoted by LR in the diagrams), the set of prices 
at which demand equals supply, taking into account the fact that as 
the price distribution changes, effort, and hence output, will change; 
we also derive the indifference curve of producers, and the indifference 
curve of consumers (denoted by W and V, respectively). 
AWe shall show that essentially any configuration of curves can 
occur, under not implausible conditions. We consider first the rela- 
tionship between the effect on utility of price stabilization in the long 
run and in the short. In the diagrams the point P represents the 
equilibrium before stabilization. The 45? line, along which Pi = P2, 
consists of points of perfect price stabilization. Movements toward 
the 45? line thus represent partial price stabilization schemes. We thus 
shall contrast levels of welfare at P with that at a point such as P*, in 
Figure I. In our analysis, the shape of the indifference curves and 
feasibility loci play no role; what is crucial is the relative magnitude 
of the slopes. For simplicity we have drawn all the curves as straight 
1. We simplify by assuming that demand depends only on the price of the given 
crop. Implicitly, we assume that farmers do not consume their own output. 
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lines in logarithmic space (i.e., exhibiting constant elasticities) though 
in practice they would almost never be. Since producers' welfare in- 
creases with an increase in prices, points above the indifference curve 
through P represent higher levels of welfare: points below W represent 
lower levels of producer welfare. Thus, if, say, the long-run feasibility 
locus is steeper than the producer's indifference curve, producers' 
welfare is increased by a movement from P to P*; conversely if the 
feasibility locus is flatter than the producer's indifference curve. Thus, 
Figure Ia illustrates what is perhaps the conventional wisdom: com- 
modity price stabilization improves the welfare of producers, but the 
short-run gains are partly (but not completely) dissipated by long-run 
supply responses, which tend to reduce prices. Figure lb illustrates, 
however, a situation where in the long run producers respond to the 
price stabilization program by reducing effort; as a result, the long-run 
gains exceed the short-run gains. Such might be the case if individuals 
are particularly sensitive to low incomes. If the reduction in price 
variability were to reduce income variability, then individuals would 
work less hard to insure against this "worst off" state. Figures Ic and 
Id illustrate cases where the short-run effect is to lower welfare: this 
can occur if the elasticity of demand is greater than unity, so that 
income variability is less than output variability. Reducing price 
variability can then increase income variability, and thus in turn may 
lower producer welfare. In Figure Ic, as a result, farmers reduce their 
effort, and this increases prices, thus partly mitigating the loss in 
utility from the price stabilization scheme, while in Figure Id (for 
reasons similar to that given above) individuals respond to the in- 
creased variability by working harder, thus exacerbating the loss of 
welfare. 
These are not, however, the only possible patterns. In particular, 
in the short run, welfare may be lowered, but the supply response 
(through a decrease in effort) results in such a large price increase that 
in the long run, welfare is increased (Figure Ie); or conversely, in the 
short run, welfare may be increased, but the supply response may be 
so great that the long-run effect of welfare may be deleterious (Figure 
If). 
In Figure II, we introduce the consumers' indifference curve. It 
is important to remember that while price increases raise producers' 
welfare, they lower consumers' welfare. 
Thus, if the consumers' indifference curve is flatter than the 
long-run feasibility locus, price stabilization will lower consumers' 
welfare; conversely if it is steeper. For simplicity, we focus on the 
long-run supply responses. (The analysis for the short-run supply 
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Commodity price stabilization makes producers worse off and consumers better off 
responses is essentially identical.) Figure Ha illustrates the conven- 
tional wisdom: if consumers "like" price variability, then the reduction 
in price variability lowers their welfare; at the same time, producers' 
welfare is increased. But Figure IIb illustrates a case where both 
producers and consumers are worse off; in Figure IIc they are both 
better off, and in Figure IId producers are worse off, while consumers 
are better off. 
As we asserted earlier, any of the configurations depicted in 
Figures I and II could occur; none can be considered perverse. Which 
will occur depends on detailed calculations of the slopes of each of the 
four loci, to which we now turn. 
IV. THE BASIC ANALYTICS 
4.1. The Producer's Indifference Curve 
The locus of values of PI and P2, which generate the same ex- 
pected utility as the original pair, can be found from equation (2), 
ignoring any changes in effort (since, by the envelope theorem, these 
will not affect utility near the original equilibrium point). This locus 
is an indifference curve in price space, shown as W in Figure I, and 
its elasticity at any point is found by implicitly differentiating equa- 
tion (2) with respect to p 1: 
(6) ~(& - (-d In P2) =ulPii = ulyl > 0. 6 d Inp u2p2p2u2y2 
4.2. The Iso-Effort Curve 
The locus of price pairs that generate the same supply of effort 
x is found by differentiating equation (5), and its elasticity is 
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(-d In P2 _ u1p16(1 - R1) _ 1-R (7) d IpI -R2 (dlnp1 ~- u2p202(1-R2) 1-R2, 
where Ri is the coefficient of relative risk aversion in state i: 
Ri -Eyiu (yi)lu'(yi) 
This shows that the loci of constant expected utility and constant 
effort coincide if we assume constant relative risk aversion, but not 
otherwise. y is positive if both R1 and R2 are greater or less than unity, 
but if one is greater than and the other less than unity, then it is 
negative. 
4.3. Short-Run Feasibility Locus 
Two other curves are needed for the analysis. The set of price 
pairs that equate supply and demand in the short run, with effort heid 
constant, describe a short-run equilibrium stabilization scheme, and 
the locus is described by equation (3). Its elasticity is 
(8) (SR - I d=D(p- ) > 0, (8) 
-~~~~~ In dlpi ) (2D (P2) 
where c, is the price elasticity of demand: 
-d In D(pi) 
dlnp , =,2.  In Pi 
Thus, at the point where there is no pure stabilization, 
(SR = 
(262 
4.4. Long-Run Feasibility Locus 
In the long run the stabilization scheme must take account of the 
supply response, and hence recognize that the right-hand side of 
equation (3) is a function of prices: 
Q= nx(p1,P2), 
where the relationship satisfies equation (5). Its elasticity is 
(d lnP2) EID(p1) + QXi (9) (LR - d In pu e2D(p2) + QX2 
where the Xi are partial supply elasticities, found from equation 
(5): 
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(10) ~~~~ln x _Up Opi6(1 -Ri) (10) Xi 
-2 o In pi= Eu'p~OR + i,), i 1, 2. 
Equation (9) can be rewritten as 
(9') (LR = X) + (1 - X)(SR, 
where 
A = QX2/(2D(p2) + QX2). 
Thus, if X2 and f2D(P2) + QX2 are both positive, 4LR lies between the 
short-run feasibility locus and the constant effort locus. There is a 
natural stability condition that ensures that 2D(P2) + QX2 > 0, but 
X2 may be positive or negative. 
To see this, we make use of the first-order condition (5); we can 
write 
xi = (1-R ) uipi/Eu'p 
where 
(11) z XV"/V 
the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort, and 
_ Eu'pOR (12) Eu'pO 
the (weighted) average value of relative risk aversion. Xi has the same 
sign as (1 - Ri), and thus may be positive or negative. However, it is 
natural to restrict 
(13) EiD (pi) + QX > 0, i = 1, 2. 
Xi, as we remarked, is the elasticity of supply with respect to an in- 
crease in pi, if the system is to be stable, in the Walrasian sense, if the 
supply curve is backward bending, it is steeper than the demand curve. 
That is what (13) implies. 
If we measure the elasticity of supply ? as the proportional in- 
crease in average output to the same proportional change of prices 
in all states, then 
d dlnQ 
_X + X2 1 -R 
d Inp 2 R + y 
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V. EFFECT ON PRODUCERS IN THE SHORT RUN 
In the short run the effects of stabilization are to move prices 
along the short-run locus of equation (3). Whether this makes pro- 
ducers better or worse off depends on whether this locus is steeper or 
flatter than the indifference curve, i.e., whether 
(SR 
i.e., 
ela, U lp161 
(202 a'202 
(This can be seen in Figure Ia, which shows the case in which pro- 
ducers are better off at P* than the initial point P.) The producer is 
better off at P* if and only if 
(14) U2P2/E2 > uLIPl/6l. 
The expression E/u'p appears repeatedly throughout the subsequent 
analysis. Hence (for simplicity suppressing suffices), we define 
(15) :(q) = u (p(q)) q = Ox. tt'(p(q)q)p(q)' 
dln _ dInc dlnp dlnu'dlny dlnp 
dlnq dlnpdlnq dlny dInq dInq 
d Inc 1  
(15') = _+R 1- + 
where we have made use of the fact that 
y = pq 
so 
dlny +dlnp 1 
dlnq dlnq e 
From (14) and (15), it is immediate that, since 02 > 01, producers are 
better or worse off in the short run as 
(16) f3' 5 0. 
From (15'), we see that the sign of j3' depends on three factors, the 
degree of relative risk aversion, the elasticity of demand (whether it 
is greater or less than unity), and the rate of change of the elasticity 
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of demand. If, for instance, the elasticity of demand is constant, then 
price stabilization improves producers' welfare if 
R(1 - ) > 1; 
i.e., if the elasticity of demand is small and relative risk aversion is 
large. There are two effects: changing the price distribution changes 
the mean income of producers and changes the variance of income. 
If the elasticity of demand is unity, price stabilization has no effect 
on mean income, but it always increases the variance. (Without price 
stabilization, price and quantity vary inversely, so there is no vari- 
ability in income; with commodity price stabilization, income will 
vary.) With (constant) elasticity of demand greater than unity, price 
stabilization will reduce the mean income and increase its variability, 
and hence, it will never increase producers' welfare. 
VI. EFFECT ON PRODUCERS IN THE LONG RUN 
In the long run, the stabilization scheme must take account of 
supply responses. In Figure I we have depicted the various cases 
showing that the long-run supply response may reduce, amplify, or 
reverse the short-run effect. We now need to know under what con- 
ditions each possibility will occur. 
We obtain directly at the no stabilization point P, 
[I E2_1 ULD1Ol (17) eLR - = [P ul_ p2 v(Ri - R2)] ( X 
U1P1 U?2P2 (02('2 + X2)' 
where 
(17') v = l/(Eu'pOR + xv") = 1/(Eu'pO(R + y)). 
From (17), we immediately obtain the result that producers' welfare 
is increased if 
(18) El/u'- -R1 > E2/UL2p2 - R2. 
Since : = E/L'p, producers' welfare is increased or decreased by sta- 
bilization as 
(19) 022-vR2 /1-vR1. 
Since 02> 01, we can determine which inequality holds by cal- 
culating 
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d(/3-vPR) , dR q - /3q - v - q dq dq 
vdR d in y 
(20) d In y d In q 
-yRc (I -- U/p c ) dln p\ d Iny ( e 
If we assume that the variability in 6 is not too large, we can approx- 
imate (using 17') 
(21)~~~~~~~~~~~ (21) IJ u'p(R + -y) 
Hence producers are better or worse off as a result of stabilization 
as 




the elasticity of relative risk aversion. Thus, five parameters determine 
the outcome: the elasticity of demand and the rate at which it changes; 
relative risk aversion, and the rate at which it changes; and the elas- 
ticity of the marginal disutility of effort. 
It is immediate that if relative risk aversion is constant (as we 
assumed in our earlier paper [Newbery-Stiglitz, 1979a]), the long-run 
and short-run effects are in the same direction. For the short-run 
impact to be favorable, while the long-run impact is deleterious to 
producers (Figure If), 3' < 0, and (1 - 1/E)R' < 0; i.e., if e > 1, there 
must be decreasing relative risk aversion (and relative risk aversion 
must decrease sufficiently fast). Note that the value of A' depends on 
the value of relative risk aversion, but not on its derivative; thus, it 
is clearly possible for 3' and R' both to be negative. 
Similarly, for the short-run impact to be deleterious to farmers, 
while the long-run impact is favorable requires that A' > 0 and (1 - 
1h)R' > 0 (see Figure le). 
We now ask, when will the long-run effect amplify, rather than 
reduce, the short-run effect. To ascertain this, we need to compare 
the slopes of the long-run and short-run feasibility loci: using (9') and 
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(8), we obtain, at the point of no stabilization, 
(22) (LR - (SR = Qx2ui6ipi(1 - 1) 02 
_ 
1 
E262 (2D(P2) + QX 1- R2 1 -Ri 
The sign of this is that of (using the stability condition (13)), 
(22') (1 - R1)(1 - R2) -R2 1-R& 
The term in square brackets has the sign of (since 62 > 01) 
qf'/(1 - R) + (1 - 1/)yR'/(l -R)2 
With constant relative risk aversion, 
(23) sign(QLR - tSR) = sign 3'(1 -R), 
confirming our earlier result that, with constant relative risk aversion 
less than unity, the long-run impact reduces the short-run effect. If 
R < 1 for all y in the relevant region, and 
0,(O'q + (1 - 1/E)yR') 
or R > 1 for all y in the relevant region, and 
t oa 




the long-run impact will amplify rather than reduce the short-run 
effect. 
VII. CONSUMERS' WELFARE 
So far, we have only studied the effects of price stabilization on 
producers, both in the short run and in the long. This is natural, if our 
primary concern is with the welfare of producers. But from a global 
point of view, we should also consider the welfare of consumers. This 
may easily be done using the diagrammatic techniques already 
employed. 
We represent the consumer's welfare by his indirect utility 
function, 
V(p,I), 
where I is consumer income, assumed independent of prices p, and 
the state of the world 0, so that his expected utility is just 
EV(p,I), 
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and his indifference curve in (P1,P2) space has an elasticity (with an 
absolute value) of 
(24) v= -Pi D(p1)pi VI (pI) P2Vp2 D(p2)p2VI(p2I)' 
(using Roy's identity that Vp = -D (p) VI). 
Consumers are better (worse) off as 
(V > (>)tLR- 
Using (24) and (9), and the derivations of equations (15) and (17'), 
consumers are worse off (better off) if 
P1O1VI(P1,I) Pi~lU'(01 + v(1 - R1)) 
P2O2V1(p2,I) P202U2(G2 + v(1 - R2)) 
or 
(25) (du'/Vj)jf + A(1 - R)} < (>) 0, 
dq 
or 
(26) - [3q0 + v(1 - R) -- R(l -)> (<) 0. 
The numerator of the expression in brackets is the expression 
we encountered earlier in (20): it is positive if producers are worse off, 
negative if they are better off. Thus, a necessary condition for both 
producers and consumers to be worse off is that 
(27) R(f-1) > VI 
Note that VIP can be of either sign. A simple interpretation of VIP in 
terms of the properties of the consumer's demand function can easily 
be obtained: 
(28) Vj RC = (  -), 
VI 
where 
RC= - VIl VI, consumer's relative (income) risk aversion 
77 dInD income elasticity of demand 
= DI n I' 
a =PD/I, share of expenditure of the given commodity. 
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Thus, if producers are sufficiently risk-averse relative to consumers, 
and e> 1, it is possible that both producers and consumers are made 
worse off as a result of commodity price stabilization. The reason is 
simple, for if the elasticity of demand is greater than one, price sta- 
bilization destabilizes income making farmers worse off, and possibly 
leading them to reduce supply to the extent that consumers are also 
made worse off. To interpret (26) further, we use (15') and the ap- 
proximation (21) (valid so long as output is not too variable) to 
write 
(29) (R+ ) + 1 R(1-R+ K)>(<) V 
+ d In p/dn R + Iy 
Finally, if the market is to be stable for all values of 6, the stability 
condition, equation (13), imposes a simple constraint on the param- 
eters, 
(30) e > (R-1)I(R + a), 
which is automatically satisfied if R < 1 or e> 1. 
Equations (29), (20'), and (30) now allow us to identify the fea- 
sible conditions under which price stabilization makes both the pro- 
ducers and consumers better off or worse off, or makes one group 
better off and the other worse off. Since the equations contain a large 
number of unfamiliar parameters, it may be helpful to relate these 
to more familiar assumptions. 
Constant relative risk aversion K = 0 
Constant absolute risk aversion A: R = Ay K = 1 
Constant elasticity of demand d ln E= 0 d ln p 
Linear demand schedule d In e 1 + 
d lnp 
Consumers' constant marginal utility of income PVIP/V1 = 0. 
In general, we could expect p VIP/V1 to be small, as it is weighted by 
consumers' expenditure share in the commodity (cf. equation (28)), 
which would typically be small for a single commodity, except possibly 
essential food grains, in which case VIP would typically be positive. 
If producers are near subsistence, one might expect K to be negative. 
We can now examine a number of special cases. 
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(a) The easiest case to analyze is that in which y = c, or the 
producer is completely unwilling to vary his effort and supply is totally 
inelastic. In this case the short- and long-run impacts are identical. 
Consumers are worse off or better off as a result of price stabili- 
zation as 
d In e + a(OR - RC) Q 1. 
d In p 
Not surprisingly, when there is no producer response, whether con- 
sumers are made better or worse off depends only on the properties 
of the consumers' utility function. It is clear that both groups could 
be made worse off, for consider a linear demand schedule, with 
equilibrium on the elastic (upper) half, and constant relative risk 
aversion. Both will be worse off, from (20') and (31) if 
R > (/( - 1) > 0, 
a(n- RC) > -E. 
However, with a constant elasticity of demand, consumers lose from 
price stabilization only if a(i - RC) > 1, which for agricultural com- 
modities is not likely. 
(b) VIP = 0, and d In e/d In p = 0; i.e., constant elasticity of 
demand and zero consumer price risk aversion. Is it possible for price 
stabilization to make both groups worse off? If so, then from equation 
(27) demand must be elastic: in which case the stability condition (30) 
is automatically satisfied. For consumers to be worse off from (29), 
(32) R(E-1)(1-R+ K)> f(R + a). 
Equation (32) requires (since e> 1) 
1-R + K> X > 1, 
1 -1/E 
which in turn requires K > 0, i.e., R' > 0. For producers to be worse off, 
from (20'), 
(33) (1 + -y/R)(1 + R(E -1)) > K(1 - 1/e), 
We can summarize these conditions as follows. 
Proposition. For price stabilization to be adverse for both consumers 
and producers with constant elasticity demand and zero con- 
sumer price risk aversion, demand must be elastic and relative 
risk aversion must be increasing. 
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For example, if farmers have constant absolute risk aversion,2 
so that K = 1, then stabilization will be inefficient if e = 4, -y = 0, R 
< 2. (Producers are worse off for all R > 0, using (33).) 
It should be clear that we can find conditions under which sta- 
bilization is Pareto improving simply by reversing the inequalities, 
provided that the stability condition of equation (30) is still satisfied. 
It is possible to find such parameters. 
The reason for the complexity of the results should be apparent. 
A number of distinct effects can be identified: 
(a) In the short run, when producers do not adjust their pro- 
duction levels, there are two effects, a risk effect and a mean income 
effect. Both of these may be of either sign. Since price and quantity 
are inversely related, a reduction in the variability of prices will ac- 
tually increase the variability in income of farmers, unless the elas- 
ticity of demand is very low. This increase in the variability of income 
will lower producers' welfare. It will reduce it more the greater is their 
risk aversion. If the elasticity of demand is low, price stabilization will 
reduce the variability of farmers' income. 
Mean expenditure by consumers on the given commodity may 
increase or decrease, again depending on the structure of demand. If 
the individual has a unit elastic demand curve, then mean expenditure 
will be unaffected. With a constant elasticity demand curve, expen- 
diture is a convex or concave function of quantity consumed de- 
pending on whether the elasticity of demand is less or greater than 
unity, and thus, mean income of farmers increases or decreases as the 
elasticity of demand is less or greater than unity. 
(b) In the long run, producers will adjust their effort, and this 
will affect the prices they receive. The magnitude of this response 
depends on the effect of price stabilization on the mean value of the 
marginal return to effort, and this need not move in the same direction 
as the mean value of utility. Whether it does or not depends on the 
whole shape of the utility function as well as on the shape of con- 
sumers' demand functions (which determines the effect of the change 
in effort on prices). 
VIII. EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
So far, we have considered only consumers and producers; we 
have ignored the profits or losses of the stabilization authority. The 
2. Newbery [19761 gives another example of Pareto inferior stabilization in which 
producers have a mean-variance utility function, which for small risk is equivalent to 
constant absolute risk aversion. 
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magnitude of these depend on the costs of storage. If the initial sit- 
uation were an equilibrium, where the price differential were just 
equal to the (marginal) cost of storage, so no storage was actually done, 
then the marginal profit of the stabilization authority from engaging 
in a small amount of storage (price stabilization) would be zero. Thus, 
our earlier analysis is directly applicable; under the conditions given 
in Section VII, where price stabilization made both producers and 
consumers worse off, we can now say unambiguously that stabilization 
leads to a Pareto inferior equilibrium. 
More generally, we can write the (expected) profits from storage 
(assuming a zero interest rate, constant storage costs c, and that PI 
> P2) as 
(34) wr(p2,p1) = (PI - c - P2)(62X - D(p2)). 
If S is the amount transferred from the high output state O2 to 
the low output state, 01, then 
(35) S -2x -D(p2) = D(pi)-Oix 
so 
dP2 1 dpI 1 
(36) dS D'(p2)' dS D'(p ) 
If 1p ,p ,ScJ represents the initial competitive equilibrium with 
storage, then 
(37) 7r(p 2,P lSC) = 0 
and 
(38) dr = S ,dp - dP 2 - as S ' 0. dS dS dS) 
The model analyzed in previous sections implicitly assumed at the 
competitive equilibrium that there was just no storage, so 
d r(pc2p,P O)_ 
dS 
Hence, for small amounts of stabilization (or destabilization) we can 
ignore the profits or losses of the stabilization authority. 
More generally, however, we cannot; to analyze the effects of 
stabilization, we need to specify how the deficits of the stabilization 
authority are financed, and how the profits are allocated. For sim- 
plicity, and to make the most favorable case possible for price stabi- 
lization, we assume that all profits are distributed to producers. 
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There are two approaches we can take at this point. We can as- 
sume that in the initial situation, there was no storage. (There are thus 
two market failures-an absence of risk markets and an absence of 
an intertemporal arbitrage market.) We then consider the impact of 
a small amount of stabilization. The second approach is to assume that 
initially there is a competitive equilibrium level of storage, and ask 
what happens if that level is increased.3 
(i) No storage initially. If there is no storage initially, in the high 
output state, the stabilization authority will have to purchase S units 
of the good; to finance this, it imposes a lump sum tax on producers 
in the amount p2(S)S. In the low output state, the buffer authority 
sells the stock, and distributes the profits, 
(P1(S) - c)S, 
as a lump sum payment to producers. (We could alternatively have 
assumed that the purchases of the buffer stock authority are financed 
by an output tax, and the profits are distributed through an output 
subsidy. We have chosen this particular formulation to avoid con- 
fusing any distortionary effects of the taxation with the risk effects 
of the stabilization policy.) Since 
Yi = p161x + (PI - c)S, Y2 = P262X - P2S, 
we can now easily calculate, along the short-run equilibrium curve 
2dV ,(dpI (P- U dp2 
(39) 2- 1=?u'i(ix dS+ p1-cl + u2 (02x dS2 _P2) (39) ~~dSls=o I~ 2 X S P 
(, 1 - 1 )-' -1 )- c'l Z 
as 
Alp (1 -eI U2P2 (1e)+ CUI; 
i.e., if c = 0, as 
(40) R(l-E)2 + -1 + O. 
This is a slight modification of conditions (15') and (16). If E' = 0, and 
e < 1, (16) and (40) are identical; producers are more likely to be worse 
3. To increase the level of storage, either the government must subsidize storage, 
or it must completely take over the storage activity from the private sector, since when 
S > S*, pI - c < P2, and the profits from storage are negative. 
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off if ('/e < 0. If c > 0, it is even more likely that producers will be worse 
off. Similarly 
dV VP~dp1 __ 2 P 




(41) d In [VI(PI)PI] = a(Rc ) + 1 - P . 
dlnp < 
This is identical to (31) derived earlier; (41) and (40) can both be 
negative: stabilization can lead to a Pareto inferior equilibrium. 
The analysis of the long-run equilibrium follows along parallel 
lines, and is discussed in Newbery and Stiglitz [1981]. 
(ii) Deviations from competitive equilibrium with storage: a 
storage subsidy. Now, we assume that there is competitive storage; 
the government would like to stabilize prices beyond the level pro- 
vided by the market. To this end, it imposes a storage subsidy in the 
amount T, financed by a lump sum tax on producers in the period in 
which the goods are placed in storage. We shall show that there are 
conditions in which such a tax makes both producers and consumers 
worse off; there are other conditions under which a storage tax makes 
producers and consumers better off. 
In the market equilibrium 
(42) P1 -c + T = P2 
Hence, differentiating (42) with respect to T, and using (36), we see 
that 
(43) dT S - D'(P2) + D'(pi)) 
The lump sum tax on output in the high output state is TS. Again, for 
simplicity, we focus on the short-run impact. Then since 
YI = pA61x, Y2 = P262X - TS, 
(44W) +202 dp2 
dT  T=I ku ll dS dS d T 
Thus, using (35), (36), and (43), we see that 
dW if (I 2uPI (u'-u')S 
(4) di 0k2 IJ D'(p 1) 
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This again is a simple modification of our basic condition (16). It is 
more (less) likely for producers to be made better off by a storage 
subsidy if 
(46) U2 - 1 <(>) 0, 
i.e., 
Y2 = P202X > pA61X = (P2 + c)06x 
or 
P2 + C 02 
P2 I1 
The conditions for consumers remain unaffected. It is thus apparent 
that it is possible for both producers and consumers to be worse off, 
or both producers and consumers to be better off, as a result of the 
imposition of a storage subsidy (tax). 
This is a special example of a more general result derived else- 
where [Newbery-Stiglitz, 1979b; Stiglitz, 1982] establishing that, in 
the absence of a complete set of markets, with more than one com- 
modity, the market equilibrium will be a constrained Pareto optimum 
only under very restricted conditions; in general there exists some 
policy (e.g., tax or subsidy, here on storage), which can make everyone 
better off. 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although there is little doubt that producers in less developed 
countries face considerable risk from the fluctuations in the agricul- 
tural prices which they receive, there is considerable controversy 
concerning whether any of the various proposals for stabilizing these 
prices would be desirable. 
On the one hand, there is a widespread belief that since agricul- 
tural markets are competitive, they will provide an efficient level of 
storage activity (and hence an efficient level of price stabilization). 
We have shown that this belief is not well founded: we have identified 
conditions under which some intervention in the market could make 
everyone better off.4 
On the other hand, we have also shown that the widespread belief 
in the desirability of stable prices may also not be well founded, when 
4. A more general argument that in the absence of a complete set of risk markets, 
the allocation of resources is not even a constrained Pareto optimum is contained in 
Newbery and Stiglitz 11979b]. 
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there are exogenous sources of risk and when there are incomplete or 
absent risk markets. In particular, it is possible that the stabilization 
of commodity prices may lead both producers and consumers to be 
worse off. An implication of this result is that under these circum- 
stances, further destabilization of prices would make consumers and 
producers better off. The conditions under which stabilization is 
Pareto inferior include cases where, as a result of the destabilization, 
effort on the part of farmers is reduced in the long run; the reduction 
in average supplies makes consumers worse off, even though they have 
gained somewhat from the reduction in risk. Alternatively, there are 
conditions under which stabilization may make both groups better 
off. In still other cases, one group gains at the expense of the other. 
The analysis of the response of farmers to price stabilization 
constitutes the third important contribution of this note. Again, we 
have shown that the widespread belief that such general equilibrium 
responses modify (reduce) the short-run effects, but do not qualita- 
tively change them, is also not well founded. We have shown how, 
under certain circumstances, they may amplify the short-run re- 
sponses, while under other circumstances, the qualitative analysis is 
reversed: producers might gain in the short run but be worse off in the 
long run. 
Finally, we need to emphasize (as we noted above) that these 
results are not perversities; they do not require unreasonable as- 
sumptions concerning the production functions, utility functions of 
producers, or utility functions of consumers. Nor do they arise from 
a failure of stability conditions to hold. Rather, they are a reflection 
of the fact that risky markets with incomplete insurance may behave 
in ways that are fundamentally different from conventional 
markets. 
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